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 NOTE 
Shareholder Nomination Restrictions: A 
Corporate Governance Mystery 
St. Denis J. Villere & Co. v. Epiq Systems, Inc., No. 1516-CV26509 (Mo. Cir. Ct. 
Jackson Cty. Apr. 5, 2016) 
Aristotle A. Butler* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Envision a citizen registered to vote in his or her state’s gubernatorial 
election.  Further suppose that in the months leading up to the general elec-
tion, that citizen is denied the right to vote in any of the primaries for that 
governorship.  Effectively, the citizen is permitted to vote for whomever he 
or she chooses in the general election but lacks the power to help select who 
ultimately participates in that race.  Now, hypothesize the reason that person 
is prevented from voting in the primary is to ensure that those promulgating 
the rule can hand-select the candidates. 
When electoral rights such as these “are subjected to ‘severe’ re-
strictions,” the United States Supreme Court has held that “the regulation 
must be ‘narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling im-
portance.’”1  It has further held that “[c]asting a ballot in a primary election 
established and regulated by state law is an act of voting . . . and the immuni-
ty against discrimination on account of race or color which is guaranteed by 
[the Constitution] protects the plaintiff in his right to vote in such primary, 
where the only obstacle interposed is that he is a negro.”2 
So, what does this have to do with corporate governance?  In Nixon v. 
Herndon, the discriminatory nomination restrictions were held unconstitu-
tional because they created a suspect classification that prevented African 
Americans from having any real choice in selecting their elected officials.3  
Corporate governance in a publicly held corporation is analogous.  To effec-
 
*B.A., Westminster College, 2015; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of 
Law, 2018; Note and Comment Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2017–2018.  Thank 
you to Professor Thom Lambert for his assistance throughout the writing process; to 
the editors of the Missouri Law Review for their helpful comments and feedback dur-
ing the editing process; and to my family and friends for their unwavering support. 
 1. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433–34 (1992) (quoting Norman v. Reed, 
502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)) (applying strict scrutiny, the Court’s most stringent stand-
ard of review reserved specifically for rights deemed fundamental to the exercise of 
liberty). 
 2. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 536–37 (1927). 
 3. See id. at 541.  
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tively participate in the maximization of their investment, shareholders in a 
company have the right to vote and to nominate candidates for director.  Ab-
sent the right to nominate, the right to vote in the ultimate election becomes 
severely watered down.  Despite corporate governance existing for decades, 
the area of nomination restrictions has gone largely without judicial analysis. 
This Note first introduces the facts and judgment of a recent case in the 
Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri: St. Denis J. Villere & Co. v. Epiq 
Systems, Inc.4  It then examines the origins of shareholders’ right to nominate 
candidates for director, the purpose of that right, and the background for ana-
lyzing restrictions of that right.  It next discusses the judgment of the court.  
To be clear, the holding of the actual case is largely insignificant for the pur-
poses of this Note.  Its facts, however, do present an important example of 
shareholder nomination restriction issues, which are the focus of this Note.  
Finally, this Note concludes by evaluating the nomination restrictions in the 
case, as well as other possible restrictions; addressing what should be the 
source of shareholders’ right to nominate; and proposing the appropriate legal 
framework within which such restrictions should be reviewed. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
St. Denis J. Villere & Company, L.L.C. (“Villere”), a Louisiana invest-
ment management firm, and George Young, Chief Compliance Officer for 
Villere, were the plaintiffs in this shareholder nomination action.5  Epiq Sys-
tems, Inc. (“Epiq”), a Missouri publicly held legal services and technology 
provider,6 and its board of directors (“Board”) were the defendants.7  Villere 
owned 5,255,524 shares of Epiq common stock.8  These shares, like most 
 
 4. St. Denis J. Villere & Co. v. Epiq Systems, Inc., No. 1516-CV26509 (Mo. 
Cir. Ct. Jackson Cty. Apr. 5, 2016). 
 5. Petition at 5–6, St. Denis J. Villere & Co. v. Epiq Systems, Inc., (Mo. Cir. 
Ct. Jackson Cty. Dec. 11, 2015) (No. 1516-CV26509). 
 6. The company’s emphasis is in providing electronic software to “law firms, 
corporations, financial institutions and government agencies – helping them stream-
line the administration of business operations, class action and mass tort, court report-
ing, eDiscovery, regulatory[] compliance, restructuring, and bankruptcy matters.”  
The Epiq Difference: About Epiq, EPIQ, http://www.epiqsystems.com/the-epiq-
difference/about-epiq (last visited Feb. 3, 2018). 
 7. Petition, supra note 5, at 6.  The Board is composed of the following mem-
bers: Tom W. Olofson, CEO; Brad D. Scott, President and Chief Operating Officer; 
W. Bryan Satterlee, Lead Independent Director; Edward M. Connolly, Jr., Director; 
Charles C. Connely, IV, Director; James A. Byrnes, Director; Joel Pelofsky, Director; 
and Douglas M. Gaston, Director (collectively, “Defendant Directors”).  Id. at 1–2, 6–
7. 
 8. Id. at 20.  Common stock is “[a] class of stock entitling the holder to vote on 
corporate matters, to receive dividends after other claims and dividends have been 
paid (esp. to preferred shareholders), and to share in assets upon liquidation.” Stock, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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publicly traded stock, were held in “street name.”9  This means the shares on 
Epiq’s stock ledger are registered under the name Cede & Company (“Cede 
& Co.”), which serves as Villere’s nominee, or stock steward.10  Young is 
also an Epiq shareholder and was nominated to serve as a member of Epiq’s 
Board.11 
Epiq has been a publicly traded company since February of 1997.12  The 
company is traded on the NASDAQ stock exchange and currently has 
37,513,009 outstanding shares of common stock.13  Epiq consistently fell 
short of its declared financial goals over the ten years prior to the suit.14  In 
particular, Epiq failed to meet its revenue guidance in five of the last seven 
years and missed its earnings per share guidance in all seven of those years.15  
Moreover, Epiq stock has largely underachieved for the greater part of a dec-
ade.16  During that time, the disparity between Epiq’s underperformance and 
the general performance of the market grew increasingly farther apart.17 
 
 9. Petition, supra note 5, at 21. 
 
[R]ecord holders are frequently depository companies (Depository Trust 
Company, for example, holding through its nominee, Cede & Co.).  They hold 
for brokers or other institutions, who in turn hold for beneficial owners.  The 
institutions sometimes contract with Independent Election Company of Amer-
ica (IECA) which distributes voting materials for brokers to their customers 
and which, as agent, receives back proxy cards or consent cards from benefi-
cial owners, collects them and makes out one or more cards for each broker or 
bank for which it acts.  IECA then physically sends voting cards to the corpo-
ration or the judges of election.  The depository companies (the actual record 
holders) will have given blanket proxies to their customers – the institutional 
record holders, who will then act themselves or through IECA. 
 
Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 664 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
 10. Petition, supra note 5, at 21.   
 
  A nominee is a person or firm into whose name securities or other proper-
ties are transferred to facilitate transactions, while leaving the customer as 
the actual owner. A nominee account is a type of account in which 
a stockbroker holds shares belonging to clients, making buying and selling 
those shares easier. 
 
Nominee, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nominee.asp (last 
visited Feb. 3, 2018); see also Nominee, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) 
(“A party who holds bare legal title for the benefit of others or who receives and dis-
tributes funds for the benefit of others.”). 
 11. Petition, supra note 5, at 6. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 9. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id.  This gap is reflected within the total shareholder returns for the previous 
annualized periods of ten, five, three, and one years.  Id.; see infra Table I. 
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As Epiq continued to struggle economically, Villere and its other inves-
tors vocalized their discontent with the Board’s actions.18  In June of 2010, 
the Board amended Epiq’s Bylaws to include an advance notice provision 
(the “Notification Bylaw”),19 which modified the eligibility requirements for 
shareholder director nominations,20 the informational disclosures required of 
both nominees and nominating shareholders,21 and the deadline for submit-
ting the information to the company.22 
On October 9, 2015, the Board again amended Epiq’s Bylaws (the 
“2014 Amendment”).23  The most significant addition of the 2014 Amend-
ment was the eligibility requirement that nominating shareholders must “have 
been in compliance with their obligations (including with respect to timing, 
filing and disclosure) under 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l through 240.13d-7 under 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (‘Exchange Act’) for a period of at least 
twelve months prior to such time as a notice is delivered.”24 
Villere, remaining unsatisfied with Epiq’s progress, prepared a slate of 
nominees to stand for election to the company’s Board (the “Nomination”).25  
Since its shares amounted to at least a seven percent beneficial ownership in 
Epiq over the previous two years, Villere instructed Cede & Co. to make the 
Nomination official prior to the notification deadline.26  Villere maintained it 
complied with all other requirements of the Notification Bylaw.27  Despite 
 
 18. Petition, supra note 5, at 10. 
 19. Id. 
 20. “[E]xcept as otherwise required by applicable law, nominations of persons 
for election to the Board of Directors shall only be given by shareholders who own at 
least five percent (5%) of the Corporation’s outstanding common stock and (x) who 
have held such shares for at least twenty-four months . . . .”  Amended and Restated 
Bylaws of Epiq Sys., Inc., 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1027207/000119312514366924/d802037de
x31.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2018) [hereinafter Amended and Restated Bylaws] (em-
phasis added) (art. II, § 2.3(a)(iii)) (amended Oct. 8, 2014). 
 21. Id. (art. II, § 2.3(c)) (providing a comprehensive list of disclosures required 
by all parties);  see also infra Appendix A (providing the full text of § 2.3(c)). 
 22. “To be timely, a shareholder’s notice shall be delivered to the Secretary at 
the principal executive offices of the Corporation not less than one hundred eighty 
(180) calendar days . . . prior to the first anniversary of the date the proxy statement 
was released to the shareholders in connection with the preceding year’s annual meet-
ing . . . .”  Amended and Restated Bylaws, supra note 20 (emphasis added) (art. II, § 
2.3(b)). 
 23. Petition, supra note 5, at 14. 
 24. Amended and Restated Bylaws, supra note 20 (art. II, § 2.3(a)). 
 25. Petition, supra note 5, at 20. 
 26. Id. at 20–21. 
 27. Id. at 21.  Villere asserted that Cede & Co. is a record holder of greater than 
five percent of Epiq stock, that it has been for more than two years, and that both 
Cede & Co. and Villere meet the requirements of the Exchange Act.  Id. 
4
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Villere’s compliance and the candidates being adequately qualified, the Board 
rejected the Nomination.28 
In December of 2015, Villere filed a complaint with the Jackson County 
Circuit Court alleging that Epiq’s Bylaws directly infringed upon valid share-
holder rights.29  Particularly, Villere asserted that the following illicitly con-
strained shareholder nomination and voting rights: “(a) the Defendant Direc-
tors’ adoption and application of the invalid [Notification Bylaw] and 2014 
Amendment[] to the Notification Bylaw; (b) Defendants’ refusal to honor 
Villere’s valid termination of the Director Appointment Agreement; and (c) 
Defendants’ invalid rejection of the Nomination.”30 
Villere further contended that the Board’s refusal to accept the Nomina-
tion was improper where: (1) the Agreement was validly terminated; (2) the 
Nomination complied with all requirements in Epiq’s Bylaws; (3) the Notifi-
cation Bylaw and 2014 Amendment served as “a pretext to reject an other-
wise valid Nomination” and were thus invalid; and (4) the amendments were 
“facially invalid” because their sole purpose was to entrench the incumbent 
Board by dampening shareholders’ ability to act effectively.31  Villere posited 
that the Board’s enforcement of the Notification Bylaw further limited the 
already minimal group of shareholders eligible to make nominations.32 
Villere requested the court issue a declaratory judgment holding the 
Agreement was validly terminated, the Nomination complied with all of 
Epiq’s Bylaws, and the bylaw amendments violated Missouri law.33  The 
complaint likewise requested Epiq be enjoined from meddling with Villere’s 
nomination to the Board.34  Epiq’s Answer and Counterclaim sought to enjoin 
both Villere and Cede & Co. “from continuing to violate the Director Ap-
pointment Agreement and . . . Bylaws by attempting to nominate directors for 
the 2016 Annual Meeting of Shareholders.”35  The Board asserted that Villere 
did not qualify as an “owner” of at least five percent under the Bylaws be-
 
 28. Id. at 21–22.  This was Villere’s second attempt at nominating candidates to 
Epiq’s Board.  Id. at 4.  Its first attempt resulted in a Director Appointment Agree-
ment (the “Agreement”) in which Epiq assented to expand the size of the board from 
seven to nine members, create a committee that would be responsible for reviewing 
its “business strateg[ies] and alternatives,” and allow Villere to appoint its own mem-
ber of the Board.  Id. at 18.  In exchange, Villere consented to a standstill period 
wherein it would refrain from seeking proxies and other shareholders’ consent with-
out first terminating the Agreement.  Id.  However, notice of Villere’s termination had 
to precede Epiq’s inclusion of Mr. Robert on its own slate for election at the next 
annual meeting.  Id.; see infra Appendix B (Director Appointment Agreement). 
 29. Petition, supra note 5, at 1, 23, 28. 
 30. Id. at 23. 
 31. Id. at 25. 
 32. See id. at 27. 
 33. Judgment at 2, St. Denis J. Villere & Co. v. Epiq Systems, Inc., (Mo. Cir. Ct. 
Jackson Cty. Apr. 5, 2016) (No. 1516-CV26509). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
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cause it was not a shareholder of record.36  They further contended that Cede 
& Co. did not qualify as an owner because it was a conglomeration of share-
holders and not a single shareholder as the term intended.37  Epiq additionally 
asked the court to issue a declaratory judgment stating that Villere’s nomina-
tion was unlawful.38 
Subsequently, the parties agreed to permit the court to rule on all prelim-
inary issues deemed purely legal in nature.39  After two days, the court issued 
its Judgment.40  The Jackson County Circuit Court began its analysis by ex-
amining the construction and termination of the Agreement under the general 
principles of contract law.41  In reaching its conclusion, the court cited the 
“plain, unambiguous language” of Section 2(c) of the Agreement.42  The 
court then proceeded to analyze Villere’s nomination, which the court held 
was compliant with all of Epiq’s Bylaws.43  In particular, the court pro-
nounced that “Cede, through Villere,” is a beneficial owner and registered 
shareholder of Epiq and, as such, is qualified to nominate a slate of direc-
tors.44  Accordingly, the court ruled that precluding Villere from presenting 
its slate of nominees at the 2016 Annual Meeting, when it had properly com-
plied with all nomination requirements, would cause it to suffer irreparable 
harm.45  Unfortunately, the court did not have occasion to address the validity 
of the shareholder nomination restrictions, which is the focus of this Note.46 
 
 36. Id. at 7. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 2. 
 39. Id.  The parties agreed that consenting to have the court determine many of 
the preliminary legal issues would eliminate the need to present “some, if not all, 
evidence.”  Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 2–3. 
 42. Id. at 6. 
 43. Id. at 6–8. 
 44. Id. at 8. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Epiq and Villere entered a settlement agreement on June 6, 2016, wherein 
Villere agreed to terminate the remainder of the litigation.  The agreement provides 
that three of the Villere nominees will be appointed to the Board, expanding its size to 
twelve members; three incumbent directors will withdraw from the board prior to 
January 1, 2017, reducing the Board’s composition back to nine members; Epiq will 
amend its Bylaws to remove the changes of the 2010 Amendment and the timing of 
the Annual Meeting; and Villere will be subject to a Standstill Period as long as any 
of its appointees is a member of the Board.  Epiq Sys., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-
K) (June 7, 2016). 
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III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A corporation is a type of business organization47 “established in ac-
cordance with legal rules into a legal . . . person that has[:] a legal personality 
distinct from the natural persons who make it up[;] exists indefinitely apart 
from them[;] and has the legal powers that its constitution gives it.”48  The 
United States Supreme Court has described corporations as “artificial be-
ing[s], invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law . . . . 
[with] only those properties which the charter of [their] creation confers . . . 
either expressly, or as incidental to [their] very existence.”49 
In Missouri, a publicly held corporation is one having “a class of voting 
stock registered with the [S]ecurities and [E]xchange [C]ommission under 
Section 12 of the Exchange Act and . . . incorporated under the laws of the 
state of Missouri.”50  The natural persons who make up a publicly held corpo-
ration are its board of directors, officers, employees, and stockholders (or 
“shareholders” as they are colloquially known).51  Publicly held corporations 
are unique in that ownership and control are separated.52  The corporation’s 
owners are its shareholders; however, the board of directors is responsible for 
managing its resources and governing operations.53  This division creates an 
environment susceptible to agency costs.54  Fundamentally, managers have an 
incentive to position other people’s money to their own benefit, but the 
shareholders want them to do whatever will generate the greatest return on 
 
 47. Business organizations can accurately be described as a group of people, 
related to each other via contract, working together in the pursuit of profit, where 
resources are allocated by fiat.  Thomas A. Lambert, Wall Chair in Corp. Law and 
Governance and Professor of Law, Univ. of Mo. Sch. of Law, Lecture in Publicly 
Held Corporations (Aug. 23, 2016). 
 48. Corporation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added). 
 49. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819). 
 50. MO. REV. STAT. § 351.015(10) (2016).  A point of clarification: Missouri 
statute is used as a reference in this Note due to the subject case’s origin.  In fact, it is 
common knowledge that the great majority of corporations are incorporated in the 
state of Delaware.  LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE 1 
(2007), http://corp.delaware.gov/pdfs/whycorporations_english.pdf. 
 51. Lambert, supra note 47. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id.  “A board of directors shall consist of one or more individuals with the 
number specified or fixed in accordance with the articles of incorporation or bylaws.”  
MO. REV. STAT. § 351.315(1) (2016). 
 54. Plaintiff’s Expert Designation: Professor Thomas A. Lambert at 13, St. Denis 
J. Villere & Co. v. Epiq Systems, Inc., (Mo. Cir. Ct. Jackson Cty. Mar. 7, 2016) (No. 
1516-CV26509) [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Expert Designation: Lambert] (“[L]osses . . . 
occur when an agent (director) fails to put the resources of the principal (the share-
holders) to their highest and best use.”). 
7
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their investment.55  Whenever a corporation’s resources are not put to their 
best ends, an agency cost – social waste – occurs.56 
To prevent social waste, directors are subjected to certain fiduciary du-
ties – namely, a duty of care and a duty of loyalty.57  The duty of care re-
quires directors to act in a manner they reasonably believe to be in the best 
interests of the corporation.58  Similarly, “[t]he duty of loyalty requires that 
the best interests of a corporation and its shareholders take precedence over 
any self-interest of a director, officer, or controlling shareholder that is not 
shared by the stockholders generally.”59  Managers are also constrained by 
the potential for corporate takeovers and the nomination process for direc-
tors.60 
With this basic structure in mind, Part A briefly discusses the frame-
work under which courts evaluate corporate documents and the intent of their 
drafters.  Part B then examines the nature of shareholder nominations, and 
Part C evaluates directors’ ability to control that process. 
A.  Interpreting Corporate Documents 
It is commonplace in Missouri for corporate documents, including any 
agreements, articles of incorporation, and bylaws, to “be construed according 
to [the] general rules governing contracts.”61  The construction of contracts is 
a question of law to be determined by the courts.62 
Where parties to a dispute disagree as to the effect of a provision in a 
corporate document, “[t]he cardinal principle of contract interpretation is to 
ascertain the intention of the parties and to give effect to that intent.”63  The 
contract’s terms are “read as a whole to determine the intention of the parties 
 
 55. See id. (In the corporate context, “managers may squander assets of their 
shareholder principals by acting negligently or with self-interest.”).  Corporate waste 
is “an exchange that is so one sided that no business person of ordinary, sound judg-
ment could conclude that the corporation has received adequate consideration.”  In re 
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 759 (Del. Ch. 2005).  “In other 
words, waste is [an] . . . unconscionable case[] where directors irrationally squander 
or give away corporate assets.”  Id. at 749 (second alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000)). 
 56. See Plaintiff’s Expert Designation: Lambert, supra note 54, at 13. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d at 751. 
 59. HCI Inv’rs, LLC v. Fox, 412 S.W.3d 424, 431 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting 
Becker v. Knoll, 239 P.3d 830, 834 (Kan. 2010)). 
 60. Plaintiff’s Expert Designation: Lambert, supra note 54, at 13. 
 61. DCW Enters., Inc. v. Terre du Lac Ass’n, Inc., 953 S.W.2d 127, 130 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1997). 
 62. Schneidler v. Feeder’s Grain & Supply, Inc., 24 S.W.3d 739, 742 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2000). 
 63. Dunn Indus. Grp., Inc. v. City of Sugar Creek, 112 S.W.3d 421, 428 (Mo. 
2003) (en banc) (per curiam). 
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 4 [2017], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss4/8
2017] SHAREHOLDER NOMINATION RESTRICTIONS 1149 
and are given their plain, ordinary, and usual meaning.”64  Further, the court 
interprets the terms of the document in such a way as to “avoid rendering 
other terms meaningless.”65  This is because “[a] construction that attributes a 
reasonable meaning to all the provisions of the agreement is preferred to one 
that leaves some of the provisions without function or sense.”66 
A contract is not to be found ambiguous “merely because the parties 
disagree as to its construction.”67  Rather, the language of a contract “is am-
biguous when there is uncertainty as to its meaning and it is fairly susceptible 
to more than one meaning so that reasonable persons may fairly and honestly 
differ on construction of its terms.”68  Ambiguity also exists where the terms 
are marred by “duplicity” or “indistinctness.”69  In the case of an unambigu-
ous contract, “the intent of the parties is determined from the contract 
alone.”70  Moreover, a court does not opt for its own construal of the parties’ 
intent where it is “expressed in [the] clear, unambiguous language” of the 
contract.71  A court may not fabricate an ambiguity or draw upon extrinsic 
evidence “to vary or contradict the terms of an unambiguous agreement.”72 
B.  Shareholder Nominations 
Within the corporate governance of a publicly held company, it is the 
responsibility and the right of shareholders to elect the company’s directors.73  
Shareholders have been held to be “the ideological underpinning upon which 
the legitimacy of directorial power rests.”74  Allowing shareholders to elect a 
corporation’s directors is essential “as [a] . . . disciplinary tool to limit agency 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. DCW Enters., Inc. v. Terre du Lac Ass’n, Inc., 953 S.W.2d 127, 130 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1997). 
 69. Taylor v. Bar Plan Mut. Ins. Co., 457 S.W.3d 340, 344 (Mo. 2015) (en banc). 
 70. Schneidler v. Feeder’s Grain & Supply, Inc., 24 S.W.3d 739, 742 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2000). 
 71. Dunn Indus. Grp., 112 S.W.3d at 429. 
 72. Id. 
 73. MO. REV. STAT. § 351.315(2) (2016) (“The articles of incorporation may 
confer upon holders of any class or series of stock the right to elect one or more direc-
tors who shall serve for such term and shall have such voting powers as shall be stated 
in the articles of incorporation.”).  Moreover, Congress has explicitly recognized a 
right to vote in federally regulated industries such as national banks.  12 U.S.C. § 61 
(2012) (“In all elections of directors, each shareholder shall have the right to vote the 
number of shares owned by him for as many persons as there are directors to be elect-
ed . . . .”). 
 74. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
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costs and to facilitate beneficial changes in corporate control.”75  In order to 
exercise control over a corporation through its board, shareholders must be 
able to either elect new directors or vote to remove incumbent directors.76  It 
has become an “[i]nternationally accepted corporate governance principle[]” 
that the right to elect directors rests with shareholders77 and that 
“[s]hareholder voting rights are sacrosanct.”78 
The right to nominate, while related, is “conceptually and chronological-
ly distinct from the right to vote on the election of such candidates.”79  A 
nomination, as it pertains to corporate democracy, “involves formally placing 
the name of a candidate for office before the electorate at a meeting of the 
electorate to elect members of the governing body.”80  The intent of the nom-
ination is to draw the attention of the voters to the nominee’s candidacy and 
to “facilitate[] the election of the nominee over any candidate not nominated 
but who might otherwise be eligible for election through a write-in or equiva-
lent mechanism.”81 
What then is the legal source of shareholders’ right to nominate?  Unlike 
the right to vote, the right of shareholders to nominate candidates for director 
is largely nonexistent in corporate statutes.82  Absent the express grant of a 
right to nominate in a corporation’s articles of incorporation or bylaws, the 
source of shareholders’ right to nominate is largely amorphous.83  It is com-
mon practice for articles or bylaws to place limitations on shareholders’ abil-
ity to nominate; however, “a provision affirmatively conferring that right . . . 
 
 75. Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Director Nominations, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 117, 
118 (2014). 
 76. Plaintiff’s Expert Designation: Lambert, supra note 54, at 14.  Epiq, with the 
inclusion of its shareholder nomination restrictions, has made a removal vote practi-
cally impossible.  Id.  Missouri corporate law provides that a removal vote has to 
happen at a meeting specifically designated for such voting.  MO. REV. STAT. § 
351.315(3) (2016).  Epiq’s Bylaws preclude shareholders themselves from being able 
to convene “special meetings,” and “provide for no alternative procedure [to] . . .  
pursue director removal.”  Plaintiff’s Expert Designation: Lambert, supra note 54, at 
14.  It stands to reason that no authorized member of the Board would call such a 
meeting voluntarily.  Consequently, shareholders only hope to use their voting rights 
to exercise control in the electoral process. 
 77. Hamermesh, supra note 75, at 119. 
 78. Icahn Partners LP v. Amylin Pharms., Inc., No. 7404-VCN, 2012 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 85, at *11 (Del Ch. Apr. 20, 2012). 
 79. Hamermesh, supra note 75, at 126. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 127. 
 82. The lone exception being the state of Maryland.  MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & 
ASS’NS § 2-504(f) (West 2017) (stating “[t]he charter or bylaws may require any 
stockholder proposing a nominee for election as a director or any other matter for 
consideration at a meeting of the stockholders to provide advance notice of the nomi-
nation or proposal to the corporation before a date or within a period of time specified 
in the charter or bylaws” (emphasis added)). 
 83. Hamermesh, supra note 75, at 131. 
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is surely rare at best.”84  In what little discussion of the source of the right to 
nominate candidates for director exists, two leading theories emerge: (1) it is 
intrinsically tied to the right to vote, and (2) it is within the shareholders’ 
right to participate in matters of proper business.85 
1.  The Right to Nominate Is Included in the Right to Vote 
Missouri is one of few jurisdictions that recognizes the right to nominate 
director candidates as being equally important as voting rights.86  In a 1995 
decision, it was determined that “the rights to nominate director candidates 
and propose business are integral components of a shareholder’s right to 
vote.”87  The court drew its reasoning from an earlier Third Circuit opinion, 
Durkin v. National Bank of Olyphant.  In Durkin, the court stated: 
We rest our holding as well on the common sense notion that the 
unadorned right to cast a ballot in a contest for office, a vehicle for 
participatory decisionmaking and the exercise of choice, is meaning-
less without the right to participate in selecting the contestants.  As the 
nominating process circumscribes the range of the choice to be made, 
it is a fundamental and outcome-determinative step in the election of 
officeholders.  To allow for voting while maintaining a closed candi-
date selection process thus renders the former an empty exercise.  This 
is as true in the corporate suffrage context as it is in civic elections, 
where federal law recognizes that access to the candidate selection 
process is a component of constitutionally-mandated voting rights . . . 
. And there is no more justification for precluding shareholders from 
nominating candidates for their board of directors than there would be 
 
 84. Id. at 127.  “Perhaps rarer or even non-existent is a charter or bylaw provi-
sion conferring upon the board of directors the right to nominate candidates for elec-
tion to that body.”  Id. at 127–28. 
 85. See id. at 128, 131–32; see also Levitt Corp. v. Office Depot, Inc., C.A. No. 
3622-VCN, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 47 (Del. Ch. Apr. 14, 2008) (exemplifying that 
nominations are matters of proper business).  A third theory espouses that the right to 
nominate is present in the more general right to participate in the electoral process.  
See Hamermesh, supra note 75, at 131; Harrah’s Entm’t, Inc. v. JCC Holding Co., 
802 A.2d 294, 310–11 (Del. Ch. 2002).  Nonetheless, the notion that such an integral 
right exists merely in the penumbra of such a vague entitlement is not considered in 
this Note.  See Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal 
Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 263 (1974). 
 86. See AHI Metnall, L.P. v. J.C. Nichols Co., 891 F. Supp. 1352, 1357 (W.D. 
Mo. 1995) (stating “[p]laintiff claims that Section 351.245(1) gives Missouri corpo-
rate shareholders an implicit right to nominate directors” and adopting that interpreta-
tion). 
 87. Id. at 1358. 
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for public officials to deny citizens the right to vote because of their 
race, poverty or sex.88 
More recently, decisions in other jurisdictions have advanced the notion 
that the right to vote contains the right to nominate, as well.89  In 2002, the 
Court of Chancery in Delaware asserted the “right of shareholders to partici-
pate in the voting process includes the right to nominate an opposing slate.”90  
That court also cited Durkin, reaffirming the view that the right to vote is 
meaningless without a coinciding right to nominate.91  Limitations of this 
view are addressed in Part V below. 
2.  Right to Nominate as a Matter of Proper Business 
Alternatively, the source of the right to nominate may be its necessity as 
a proper procedural requirement for conducting a meeting.92  “[A]t a meeting 
at which an election is to occur, a motion to place a candidate before the body 
for election can readily be considered to be business properly conducted . . . . 
“93  Under this supposition, the right to nominate draws upon statutory pre-
scriptions indicating that “all proper business may be transacted” at an annual 
shareholder meeting, where director elections take place.94  The idea is that “a 
nomination is a piece of ‘proper’ meeting business, distinct from the vote, 
which facilitates the subsequent exercise of collective choice in the form of 
voting.”95 
The idea that a right to nominate directors is a matter of proper business 
has been accepted by at least two courts.96  In Goldstein v. Lincoln National 
Convertible Securities Fund, Inc., a federal court applying Maryland’s corpo-
ration law pertaining to shareholder nominations found that “the general stat-
utory ‘policy [is] to allow any business at annual meetings regardless of 
whether that business is specified in the notice.’”97  Several years later, in 
Levitt Corp. v. Office Depot, Inc., the Delaware Court of Chancery asserted 
that the nomination of a candidate “for election as a director is an ‘affair’ or 
 
 88. Durkin v. Nat’l Bank of Olyphant, 772 F.2d 55, 59 (3d Cir. 1985) (emphasis 
added) (citations omitted). 
 89. Harrah’s Entm’t, 802 A.2d at 310. 
 90. Id. (quoting Linton v. Everett, No. 15219, 1997 WL 441189, at *9 (Del. Ch. 
July 31, 1997) (unpublished opinion)). 
 91. Id. at 311 (quoting Durkin, 772 F.2d at 59). 
 92. See Hamermesh, supra note 75, at 131. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 131–32. 
 97. Id. at 132 (quoting Goldstein v. Lincoln Nat’l Convertible Sec. Fund, Inc., 
140 F. Supp. 2d 424, 439 (E.D. Pa. 2001), vacated as moot, No. 01-2259, 2003 WL 
1846095 (3d Cir. 2003)). 
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‘matter’ . . . [of] ‘business’ – to be considered at the stockholders’ meeting.”98  
This perception of the right to nominate may afford greater protection than 
the previously ascribed source because it is grounded in a statutory policy 
less susceptible to board restriction.99 
C.  Limiting Shareholders’ Right to Nominate 
As is the case with most rights in the corporate setting, the right to nom-
inate directors is alienable.100  It is widely accepted that corporations can 
adopt bylaws or articles directly limiting the ability of shareholders to nomi-
nate.101  However, an important question remains largely unanswered: to 
what degree can shareholders’ right to nominate be restricted?  Put different-
ly, to what extent can a corporation’s board of directors control shareholder 
nominations? 
Due to the “obvious importance of the nomination right in our system of 
corporate governance, . . . courts have been reluctant to approve measures 
that impede the ability of stockholders to nominate candidates.”102  It has 
been repeatedly asserted that “corporate management subjects shareholders to 
irreparable harm by denying them the right to vote their shares or unneces-
sarily frustrating them in their attempt to obtain representation on the board 
of directors.”103  Nomination restrictions,104 specifically, “must not infringe 
upon the exercise of those rights in an unreasonable way.”105 
An inquiry into whether a bylaw unduly restricts shareholders’ oppor-
tunity to nominate candidates will likely turn on two factors: proportionality 
and neutrality.106  Proportionality revolves around a balancing of the “nega-
tive impact of the limitation on the right to nominate against the positive im-
pact on the interests of the corporation and its stockholders.”107  Neutrality 
focuses on the similarities between requirements of board nominations for 
 
 98. Levitt Corp. v. Office Depot, Inc., C.A. No. 3622-VCN, 2008 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 47, at *18–19 n.33 (Del. Ch. Apr. 14, 2008). 
 99. See Hamermesh, supra note 75, at 132. 
 100. See id. at 133–34. 
 101. Id. at 136. 
 102. Harrah’s Entm’t, Inc. v. JCC Holding Co., 802 A.2d 294, 310 (Del. Ch. 
2002). 
 103. Int’l Banknote Co. v. Muller, 713 F. Supp. 612, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
 104. It is important here to understand that there exists a distinction between nom-
ination restrictions contained in a bylaw amendment approved by shareholders and an 
amendment enacted solely by directors.  See Hubbard v. Hollywood Park Realty En-
ters., Inc., No. CIV. A. 11779, 1991 WL 3151, at *11 (Del. Ch. Jan. 14, 1991) (un-
published opinion).   The latter is the focus here and should be of greater concern due 
to the lack of shareholders’ consent to limit their nomination authority. 
 105. Id.  
 106. Hamermesh, supra note 75, at 139. 
 107. Id. 
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director and those of shareholders.108  Professor Lawrence Hamermesh,109 a 
renowned business and corporate law scholar, suggests that a court would 
view a provision making the process more cumbersome for shareholders but 
not directors with much greater skepticism.110  Where this is the case, a board 
necessarily “should be prepared to articulate a legitimate basis for it, ground-
ed in proper corporate interests – and should be comfortable that the differen-
tiation does not overstep the bounds of public policy.”111 
Additionally, bylaws should be interpreted and applied so they “do[] not 
operate inequitably in the circumstances.”112  In other words, their intent 
should dictate their actual effect.  Absent proof that both requirements are 
satisfied, non-enforcement will result.113  To maintain fairness, a “corporate 
election process, if it is to have any validity, must be conducted with scrupu-
lous fairness and without any advantage being conferred or denied to any 
candidate or slate of candidates.”114  “Action designed principally to interfere 
with the effectiveness of a vote inevitably involves a conflict between the 
board and a shareholder majority.”115  Review of this type of issue “involves 
a determination of the legal and equitable obligations of an agent towards his 
principal.”116  Delaware courts have held that such a determination by the 
agent must be done “honestly and competently.”117 
In sum, the permissibility of limitations on the shareholder nomination 
process remains an unsettled area of the law.  The sparse material available 
on the subject suggests the source of the right to nominate and the nature of 
the restriction being employed must both be considered in any analysis.  
Where a company includes the right to nominate in its bylaws, the issue be-
 
 108. Id. at 140. 
 109. Professor Hamermesh is a professor emeritus and former Ruby R. Vale Pro-
fessor of Corporate and Business Law at Delaware School of Law.  Professor 
Hamermesh teaches several topics including corporate finance, mergers and acquisi-
tions, securities regulation, business organizations, and corporate takeovers.  Law-
rence Hamermesh, WIDENER U. DEL. L. SCH., 
http://delawarelaw.widener.edu/current-students/faculty-directory/faculty/112 (last 
visited Feb. 3, 2018).  Additionally, he has been a member of the American Law 
Institute since 1999 and served as senior special counsel in the Office of Chief Coun-
sel of the Division of Corporation Finance at the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion in Washington, D.C. in 2010 and 2011.  Id.   
 110. Hamermesh, supra note 75, at 140. 
 111. Peter A. Atkins, Richard J. Grossman, & Edward P. Welch, Rethinking Di-
rector Nomination Requirements and Conduct in an Era of Shareholder Activism, 
SKADDEN (July 1, 2013), https://www.skadden.com/insights/rethinking-director-
nomination-requirements-and-conduct-era-shareholder-activism. 
 112. Hamermesh, supra note 75, at 149–50. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661 (Del. Ch. 1988) (quot-
ing Aprahamian v. HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204, 1206–07 (Del. Ch. 1987)). 
 115. Id. at 660. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
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comes much narrower.  A company being challenged over the validity of a 
restriction on the nomination process must be prepared to demonstrate the 
intent of the provision and how it operates to achieve that effect in practice. 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
Judge Joel P. Fahnestock set forth the judgment of the court, which 
readily concluded that Epiq’s rejection of the Villere Nomination was wrong-
ful.118  However, the court declined to reach the shareholder nomination re-
striction issue because it determined that the extreme eligibility requirements 
had been satisfied.119 
A.  Termination of the Agreement 
Judge Fahnestock’s judgment began with an analysis of whether the 
four corners of the Agreement were ambiguous.120  The court concluded the 
terms in the Agreement were unambiguous, reasoning that the language pro-
vided was not susceptible to multiple meanings nor did it create any uncer-
tainty as to its meaning.121  Because no ambiguity existed in the terms of the 
document, the court assessed the Agreement using the plain language of its 
text.122  Consequently, the court found that Villere’s termination of the 
Agreement was valid.123 
B.  Validity of the Villere Nomination 
After finding that Villere properly terminated the Agreement, the court 
shifted its focus to the Epiq nomination process and Villere’s purported com-
pliance.124  In particular, the court assessed the meaning of a shareholder enti-
tled to vote – by virtue of owning at least five percent of Epiq’s outstanding 
stock – under Epiq’s Bylaws.125  The court, again using the general principles 
of contract law, determined the language to be unambiguous and rejected 
Epiq’s contention that the term was intended to apply only to a single share-
holder.126 
Upon examining the entirety of Epiq’s Bylaws and articles of incorpora-
tion, the court stated that the term “shareholder” was not designated as a sin-
 
 118. Judgment, supra note 33, at 8. 
 119. See id. at 8 & n.7. 
 120. Id. at 4. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 4–5. 
 123. Id. at 6. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 7. 
 126. Id. 
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gle owner.127  In fact, the court elaborated that the company’s articles require 
that the company treat any registered holder of shares as its owner.128  More-
over, the court stated that the Bylaws mandate whomever is the shareholder 
of record on its ledger is deemed to be the owner entitled to all rights regard-
ing the corporation.129  Therefore, the court deemed Cede & Co. both an 
owner and shareholder capable of and entitled to nominating a slate of direc-
tors at Villere’s direction.130  The court left unclear the likelihood of the 
shareholders’ success on their claims as to the validity of the Notification 
Bylaw. 
V.  COMMENT 
While the court in Villere did not reach a conclusion on the validity of 
Epiq’s Notification Bylaw, its inaction provides an opportunity to explore the 
realm of shareholder nominations, as statutes are practically silent and court 
precedent outlining the ability to restrict that right is effectively nonexistent.  
Guided by the interpretation of the corporate documents and the determina-
tion of Villere’s compliance with the Bylaws, the court avoided addressing 
the conduct of the Board as it attempted to entrench itself.  Although the 
court’s holding and the subsequent settlement provide relief to Villere, they 
deprive shareholders generally of a concrete determination as to the limits on 
a board of directors’ ability to restrict their right to nominate.  Epiq’s Notifi-
cation Bylaw contains multiple restrictions.  In addition to an advance notice, 
Section 2.3 contains eligibility and disclosure requirements. 
A.  Establishing a Framework 
Under Missouri corporate law, incumbent directors that have not been 
re-elected are entitled to maintain their position on the board until their re-
placement has been elected and qualified.131  Missouri also mandates that a 
director be approved by majority vote to be elevated to the board.132  Without 
the ability to nominate a replacement director, it is conceivable that an in-
cumbent director could indefinitely remain on a corporation’s board, despite 
its shareholders’ wishes.133  For example, an incumbent director who fails to 
garner majority support could nevertheless remain on the board so long as the 
incumbent board nominates the same number of candidates as there are va-
cant positions.134    Should a board renominate its incumbent directors each 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 7–8. 
 130. Id. at 8. 
 131. MO. REV. STAT. § 351.315(1) (2016). 
 132. MO. REV. STAT. § 351.265 (2016). 
 133. Plaintiff’s Expert Designation: Lambert, supra note 54, at 15. 
 134. Id. at 14. 
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year while denying shareholders the authority to nominate replacements, 
these directors would remain on the board indefinitely with or without share-
holder approval.135 
Epiq’s Notification Bylaw, in conjunction with Missouri corporate law, 
unnecessarily frustrates the attempts of its shareholders to procure representa-
tion on the Board.  Moreover, it undermines the policy justifications of a ma-
jority voting standard: that “directors should enjoy the support of sharehold-
ers owning the bulk of the company’s stock.”136  Such a practice is in serious 
conflict with corporate governance principles.  It is also precisely the type of 
situation shareholders’ right to nominate is intended to counteract.   
First, it is necessary to determine which source of shareholder nomina-
tion rights makes the most sense based on the protections afforded to both 
shareholders and the corporation.  While it may seem well-settled that the 
right to vote includes the right to nominate, Professor Hamermesh points out 
several holes in this theory.  Many corporate statutes allow a company to alter 
the default rules.  For voting, this means that the typical one vote per share 
can be altered or limited in a way that requires a threshold number of shares 
to be entitled to vote.137  Professor Hamermesh posits that this linkage could 
allow corporations to stipulate in their articles or bylaws that a share does not 
entitle the holder to nominate director candidates since it is permissible to 
limit the right to vote.138  It is entirely possible for a company’s articles or 
bylaws to “create different classes or series of shares, and any class or series 
of shares may be granted multiple or fractional votes per share.”139  The right 
to vote then may be circumscribed completely for at least some classes of 
shares.  Nothing in such scenarios indicates that the right to nominate would 
also not be eliminated completely.  This cuts against the notion that the right 
to nominate should be tied to the right to vote because that right could be 
eliminated completely in certain contexts.  Construing the right to nominate 
this way fails to safeguard shareholders’ ability to protect their own invest-
ments and to influence firm control through turnover. 
Further, “the right to vote can exist and be fully exercised without any 
subsumed right to nominate.”140  For example, elections held solely by ballot 
or roll call (while hypothetical, are possible) would allow shareholders to 
 
 135. Petition, supra note 5, at 14–15.  In fact, this exact situation occurred at Epiq 
in 2014.  Id. at 17.  By Epiq’s own admission, Mr. Connolly did not receive a majori-
ty vote and was not re-elected.  Id.  In spite of this, Mr. Connolly remained on the 
board as a “holdover director.”  Id. 
 136. Plaintiff’s Expert Designation: Lambert, supra note 54, at 15. 
 137. Hamermesh, supra note 75, at 129. 
 138. Id. 
 139. ABA PUBLISHING, HANDBOOK FOR THE CONDUCT OF SHAREHOLDERS’ 
MEETINGS 72 (2d ed. 2010). 
 140. Hamermesh, supra note 75, at 130; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) 
(West 2017) (providing “[s]tockholders may, unless the certificate of incorporation 
otherwise provides, act by written consent to elect directors”). 
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exercise their right to vote without ever having employed their coinciding 
right to nominate.141  In light of these concerns, Professor Hamermesh con-
cludes that the right to nominate is best “viewed not as a form or element of 
the right to vote, but as a means to make voting rights more useful by limiting 
the informational and transaction costs of evaluating candidates.”142 
Given that the nomination process is essential to corporate democracy, 
the right of shareholders to nominate candidates for director should be 
grounded in a much stronger source.  At the very least, it should be afforded 
as a proper matter of business to be conducted at a meeting of the sharehold-
ers.  This approach still provides a company the ability to place restrictions 
on that right, such as an advance notice requirement, but precludes the right 
to remove it entirely.  Nevertheless, Professor Hamermesh’s suggested ap-
proach is not without issue.  As indicated by Vice Chancellor John W. Noble 
in Levitt, a colorable argument can be made that “business,” as it pertains to 
an annual meeting, refers only to those actions taken by the shareholders as a 
group.143  Thus, voting would be a matter of business because it involves an 
action of the entire group, but a nomination would fall short of “business” 
since it “is not an official action of the stockholders as a whole.”144  A seman-
tic problem remains in concluding that the right to vote is part of business to 
be conducted at an annual meeting.145  It suggests that in the instance of a 
corporation without an advance notice bylaw, shareholders could simply 
make nominations at the annual meeting itself.146  Surely this would fall short 
of providing the information necessary to inform shareholders in a corporate 
democracy. 
A more tenable option would be to conclude that the right to nominate is 
an inherent part of ownership.  Placing the right to nominate within the pe-
numbra of ownership comports with corporate governance principles.  It will 
further the attempt to constrain agency costs, which necessarily include the 
director nomination process.  The ability to elect and remove directors is con-
sidered “essential” for “investor protection.”147  It only makes sense to afford 
the right to nominate as fundamental to ownership because it, too, is neces-
sary for investor protection.  Shareholders’ right to vote is part of the inherent 
right to “control the firm.”148  Including the right to nominate within owner-
ship furthers the protection of this vital right of control in an essential way.  
This approach also avoids the pitfalls of tying the right to nominate to the 
right to vote (i.e., that it can be eradicated in certain scenarios).  Additionally, 
 
 141. Hamermesh, supra note 75, at 130. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Levitt Corp. v. Office Depot, Inc., C.A. No. 3622-VCN, 2008 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 47, at *18–19 n.33 (Del. Ch. Apr. 14, 2008). 
 144. Id. 
 145. See id. at *16–18. 
 146. See id. at *12. 
 147. Plaintiff’s Expert Designation: Lambert, supra note 54, at 13 (emphasis add-
ed). 
 148. Id. (emphasis added). 
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it sidesteps the semantic and group action problems of finding it is a matter of 
business to be conducted at annual meetings.  Yet it succeeds in making vot-
ing rights more useful and protecting the shareholder franchise. 
B.  Considering Potential Shareholder Nomination Restrictions 
Considering the importance of the right to nominate candidates for di-
rector, it is significant that shareholders know how much their voice can be 
muted in legitimate corporate turnover.  Using the principles of proportionali-
ty, neutrality, and inequitable application, this Note now addresses various 
possible restrictions on the right to nominate and offers a determination of 
their potential validity. 
1.  Advance Notice 
One widely-employed restriction is advance notice.  Professor 
Hamermesh indicates that notice bylaws are “commonplace” and “frequently 
upheld as valid.”149  As illustrated by Epiq’s Notification Bylaw, this type of 
restriction “typically require[s] shareholders to submit advance notice of their 
intent to introduce proposals at shareholder meetings . . . . [and] disclose their 
beneficial ownership positions as a condition for nominating directors or 
bringing forth other matters at a shareholder meeting.”150  The Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has defined beneficial owners as anyone 
owning shares with “(1) Voting power which includes the power to vote, or 
to direct the voting of, such security; and/or, (2) Investment power which 
includes the power to dispose, or to direct the disposition of, such securi-
ty.”151 
Based on these principles, “it may be inferred that an advance notice by-
law will be validated where it operates as a reasonable limitation upon the 
shareholders’ right to nominate candidates for director.”152  In order for ad-
vance notice limitations to be reasonable, they must “afford the shareholders 
a fair opportunity to nominate candidates.”153  This means the notice period 
satisfies the principles of proportionality and neutrality and will not be ap-
 
 149. Hamermesh, supra note 75, at 136–37 (quoting Goggin v. Vermillion, Inc., 
No. 6465–V CN, 2011 WL 2347704, at *4 (Del. Ch. June 3, 2011) (unpublished opin-
ion)). 
 150. Elina Khasina, Note, Disclosure of “Beneficial Ownership” of Synthetic 
Positions in Takeover Campaigns, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 904, 921 (2009). 
 151. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d–3(a)(1)–(2) (2017). 
 152. Hubbard v. Hollywood Park Realty Enters., Inc., No. CIV. A. 11779, 1991 
WL 3151, at *11 (Del. Ch. Jan. 14, 1991) (unpublished opinion). 
 153. Id. 
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plied inequitably.154  “[W]hen advance notice bylaws unduly restrict the 
stockholder franchise or are applied inequitably, they will be struck down.”155 
Epiq’s notice period of at least 180 days prior to its next annual meeting 
of shareholders is particularly burdensome because it “reduc[es] the share-
holder’s flexibility, and [makes] the marginal benefit of facilitating dissemi-
nation of additional useful information . . . considerably more attenuated.”156  
Here, such an extended period advances no legitimate corporate interest.157  
Professor Thom Lambert, an expert familiar with the nomination process, 
concluded, “It could not possibly take more than half a year for board mem-
bers to evaluate the nominees and communicate any concerns to sharehold-
ers.”158  Further, the notice period is not neutral because shareholders are 
required to submit (and vet) their nominees months prior to when the board 
members are required to submit their nominees.  Thus, Epiq’s bylaw creates 
an unfair advantage for board nominees and is applied inequitably.159 
Epiq’s notice period places an undue burden on its shareholders’ right to 
nominate.  Judging the exact cutoff point at which a notice period exceeds its 
usefulness is quite difficult; however, it is not impossible.  SEC Rule 14a-8 
allows a notice period of up to 120 days for proxy materials, suggesting that 
periods more than 120 days, a time intended to be the maximum necessary to 
ensure both shareholders and directors are reasonably informed of nominees, 
are unreasonable.160 
2.  Disclosure 
Epiq’s Notification Bylaw also includes a considerable disclosure re-
quirement for shareholders and their nominees.161  As a point of reference, 
“not a single one of the 10 largest Missouri-based public companies . . . . 
requires the intrusive disclosures demanded by the Director Defendants” in 
the instant case.162 
To date, information disclosure requirements have garnered no judicial 
attention.163  However, courts “should and would likely inquire whether the 
[requirement] seeks to elicit information comparable to what is available with 
respect to board-selected nominees, and whether the information is at least 
plausibly useful to shareholders in evaluating competing candidates for office 
 
 154. See id. 
 155. JANA Master Fund, Ltd. v. CNET Networks, Inc., 954 A.2d 335, 344 (Del. 
Ch. 2008) (quoting Openwave Sys. Inc. v. Harbinger Capital Partners Master Fund I, 
Ltd. 924 A.2d 228, 239 (Del. Ch. 2007)). 
 156. Hamermesh, supra note 75, at 140. 
 157. Plaintiff’s Expert Designation Lambert, supra note 54, at 16. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 17. 
 160. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–8(e)(2) (2017). 
 161. See infra Appendix A. 
 162. Petition, supra note 5, at 13–15. 
 163. Hamermesh, supra note 75, at 143. 
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and not unreasonably burdensome . . . to provide.”164  A good rule of thumb 
for boards is to view restrictions in light of the following question: “Would 
we, the incumbent board, be prepared to apply the requirement or rule to our-
selves and to new nominees proposed in the future by us?”165 
Nowhere do Epiq’s Bylaws indicate that board-selected nominees are 
required to submit the same information.  SEC proxy rules require a board 
provide shareholders with each of its nominees’ name; age; a description of 
“any arrangement or understanding between him and any other person(s) 
(naming such person(s)) pursuant to which he was or is to be selected”; a 
five-year employment history; and a brief discussion of “the specific experi-
ence, qualifications, attributes or skills that [support why] the person should 
serve as a director for the registrant at the time that the disclosure is made, in 
light of the registrant’s business and structure.”166  Such information is clear-
ly not as extensive as the approximately three-page list of disclosures share-
holders must make under Epiq’s Notification Bylaw. 
This inequitable treatment is not grounded in any legitimate corporate 
interest.  It plainly makes the process of nominating more onerous for share-
holders while maintaining the relatively minimal disclosure requirements for 
board-selected candidates.  With such exhaustive requirements making it 
practically unmanageable to produce a shareholder-selected nominee, the 
benefit of information is moot.  Thus, the disclosure requirements in Epiq’s 
Bylaws operate inequitably and fail to achieve their purpose.  Similarly con-
structed bylaws would likely result in non-enforcement. 
On the other hand, it is possible that a board could take steps to ensure 
its company’s extensive disclosure requirements are able to overcome a chal-
lenge.  To avoid the initial problem of severely limiting shareholders’ ability 
to produce a nominee, the disclosure process could be broken into a two-step 
progression.  At the notification stage, only the “identification of the pro-
posed nominees and their shareholder-sponsor, and the concurrent submission 
of completed preliminary questionnaires by those parties, made available to 
them through the company’s secretary” would be required.167  This would be 
a much less arduous task to achieve within the time frame of an advance no-
tice period.168  By reserving the right to require additional disclosures, the 
company could use the already obtained information to formulate what addi-
tional information it will request and a justification for requiring it.169  It 
would be much harder to successfully assert a challenge against disclosures 
narrowly tailored to individual or groups of shareholder nominees, so long as 
they are rationally related to a corporate interest.170 
 
 164. Id. at 146. 
 165. Atkins, Grossman & Welch, supra note 111. 
 166. 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(a), (e)(1) (2017). 
 167. Atkins, Grossman & Welch, supra note 111 (emphasis added). 
 168. See id. 
 169. See id. 
 170. See id. 
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3.  Ownership 
A requirement that shareholder nominations be buoyed by a minimum 
percentage of share ownership is “undoubtedly rare in the context of publicly  
traded corporations.”171  The “[s]everity of impact on the ability to nominate 
[will] depend on the individual corporation’s circumstances, most notably the 
configuration of the holdings of its shares, and the likely ability to assemble 
nomination requests from holders of the specified ownership.”172  Combina-
tion with other requirements “[presents] additional questions of validity.”173 
Epiq’s Notification Bylaw maintains that a nominating shareholder must 
own at least five percent of the outstanding shares for a period greater than 
twenty-four months.174  Its stated rationale for enacting this requirement is “to 
make sure that only large, committed, knowledgeable shareholders [can] 
nominate individuals to be elected as director.”175  Epiq’s securities filings 
indicate very few shareholders own enough shares to qualify as a nominating 
shareholder.176  More concerning is that “since 2009, there have been no more 
than three to five 5% shareholders in any given year who also were listed as a 
5% shareholder for the prior year (i.e., a 5% shareholder for 24 months).”177  
Perhaps this rare ability to meet a five percent ownership requirement is why 
such a threshold is “inconsistent with best practices.”178 
Because shareholders invest their own money in the acquisition of 
shares and thereby create a financial stake in the company’s success, “share-
holders with far smaller holdings than 5% and/or who have held shares for far 
less than two-years are [often] highly knowledgeable and committed to the 
companies in which they hold shares.”179  While this may not be true of all 
shareholders, some qualified shareholders are precluded from the nomination 
process.180  Standard practice in the proxy access context is an ownership 
requirement of no more than three percent, which should serve as a ceiling.181  
This suggests that a five percent ownership requirement is “overly onerous in 
the proxy access situation . . . [so] it is certainly an unreasonable barrier to 
making a simple nomination.”182  Certainly, the threshold for nominating 
must be lower than that for proxy access. 
 
 171. Hamermesh, supra note 75, at 151. 
 172. Id. at 153. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Plaintiff’s Expert Designation: Professor Charles M. Elson at 6, St. Denis J. 
Villere & Co. v. Epiq Systems, Inc., (Mo. Cir. Ct. Jackson Cty. Mar. 7, 2016) (No. 
1516-CV26509) [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Expert Designation: Elson]. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Plaintiff’s Expert Designation Lambert, supra note 54, at 15. 
 177. Plaintiff’s Expert Designation: Elson, supra note 175, at 4. 
 178. Plaintiff’s Expert Designation: Lambert, supra note 54, at 16. 
 179. Plaintiff’s Expert Designation: Elson, supra note 175, at 6. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(c)(2)(i) (2017). 
 182. Plaintiff’s Expert Designation: Lambert, supra note 54, at 16. 
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Epiq’s five percent ownership requirement operates inequitably by 
providing board-selected nominees an obvious advantage: very few, if any, 
shareholders will possess the requisite number of shares to produce an oppo-
nent.  Since no ownership threshold is imposed on the Board, its ownership 
restriction is not neutral.  The negative impact of the limitation on the right of 
shareholders to nominate greatly outweighs the positive impact of granting 
only potentially committed, knowledgeable nominations to the corporation.  
Suggesting that the economic interest in stock results in a superior class of 
nominees is of “questionable validity.”183 
A five percent ownership threshold unduly restricts the right of share-
holders to nominate candidates for director.  Because it is possible for direc-
tors to eliminate the ability of certain shareholders to vote, allowing such 
large ownership requirements as a prerequisite for the ability to nominate 
may have the effect of eliminating shareholders’ ability to control their in-
vestment.  That is not to say that an ownership requirement is altogether un-
duly burdensome.  Rather, it is only so in contexts where the threshold num-
ber of shares is proven to be exceptionally uncommon or unlikely.  A case-
by-case approach should be undertaken when evaluating this specific type of 
nomination restriction. 
4.  Rejection of Candidates for Failure to Satisfy Qualifications 
It is generally accepted that qualification requirements to serve as a di-
rector will be set forth in a corporation’s bylaws or articles of incorpora-
tion.184  The question is then “whether . . . a director qualification could also 
be framed as a condition to the right to nominate, such that no nominee who 
fails to satisfy the qualification requirement may be nominated for election to 
the board.”185  For example, in Triplex Shoe Co. v. Rice & Hutchins, Inc.,186 a 
court “concluded that stockholders were free to nominate and elect a candi-
date who did not at that point satisfy a share ownership qualification . . . rec-
 
 183. Hamermesh, supra note 75, at 153–54.  Professor Hamermesh suggests that 
if an ownership requirement were instead based on the justification that nominating 
should rest on the level of voting power, it would be more likely to withstand scruti-
ny.  See id.  This is based on the theory of non-profit corporations that nominations by 
shareholders with “trivial . . . voting power indicates that the nomination would most 
likely be futile and therefore unnecessarily disruptive.”  Id. at 154.  This Note disa-
grees with this alternative justification for two reasons: (1) publicly traded corpora-
tions are a world apart from non-profit corporations, and (2) such a justification 
strikes down the notion that shareholders have an inherent right to protect their in-
vestment through the corporate electoral process. 
 184. See MO. REV. STAT. § 351.310 (2016); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.02 
(2010). 
 185. Hamermesh, supra note 75, at 156. 
 186. Triplex Shoe Co. v. Rice & Hutchins, Inc., 152 A. 342, 351 (Del. 1930). 
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ognizing . . . the candidate could, before being seated, acquire the necessary 
shares.”187 
Such issues would certainly turn on a court’s interpretation of the com-
pany’s bylaws, most likely using the rules of contract.  As such, it is im-
portant that a bylaw listing requirement be drafted precisely.  It should define 
whether “a candidate who fails to meet a qualification requirement may not 
be nominated at the meeting unless the candidate has . . . come into compli-
ance with the requirement if and when elected and seated as a director.”188 
5.  Complete Elimination of the Right to Nominate 
Ultimately, may a corporation eliminate entirely shareholders’ right to 
nominate candidates for director?  The answer to this question will likely 
hinge in large part on the source of that right.  If the right to nominate derives 
from conducting proper business, “even a charter provision cannot entirely 
take that right away from a stockholder entitled to attend and vote on the elec-
tion of directors.”189  On the other hand, if the right to nominate originates in 
the statutory right to vote, it likewise may not be eliminated in its entirety.190  
Moreover, as this Note maintains, the right to nominate may not be eliminat-
ed entirely because it is a core element of share ownership and to do so would 
strip owners of any control over their own investment. 
C.  Standard of Review 
A board-enacted nomination restriction presents an inherent conflict of 
interest.  Such conflicts blatantly contradict directors’ duty of loyalty by mak-
ing it considerably easier for directors to successfully entrench themselves.  
Should courts afford the protection of the business judgment rule191 or simply 
 
 187. Hamermesh, supra note 75, at 156 (citing Triplex Shoe, 152 A. at 351). 
 188. Id. (emphasis added). 
 189. Id. at 150–51. 
 190. See id. 
 191. The business judgment rule is a jurisdictional doctrine applicable to transac-
tions of directors challenged by shareholders.  “[C]ourts will not interfere with or 
attempt to control the internal management or policy of a corporation except in cases 
of fraud, bad faith, breach of trust, gross mismanagement, or ultra vires acts on the 
part of the officers or directors.”  Leggett v. Mo. State Life Ins. Co., 342 S.W.2d 833, 
851 (Mo. 1960) (en banc) (emphasis added).  Such actions “may constitute ground for 
judicial interference, even though the act involves an exercise of the officer’s discre-
tion.”  Id.; see also Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 779–80 (Ill. Ct. App. 
1968); Kamin v. American Express, 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 812 (NY Sup. Ct. 1976); 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31 (2010). 
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use the proportional and neutral test outlined above,192 this possibility be-
comes much more likely. 
It would be permissible for restrictions approved by a majority of share-
holders – however uncommon – to continue to be evaluated using proportion-
ality and neutrality, but restrictions imposed solely by a board need to be 
analyzed under a stricter standard.  In fact, Delaware courts have previously 
indicated that these issues are “not [to] be left to the agent’s business judg-
ment” alone.193  Courts should instead apply the conditional business judg-
ment rule to board-enacted nomination restrictions.  This measure appears 
rational because restricting the ability to nominate can, generally, be equated 
to a board’s attempt to avert being replaced (i.e., taken over).  Furthermore, 
heightened “scrutiny is mandated by: . . . the threatened diminution of the 
current stockholders’ voting power . . . and . . . the traditional concern of . . . 
courts for actions which impair or impede stockholder voting rights.”194 
Use of a conditional business judgment rule would mean: “(a) a judicial 
determination regarding the adequacy of the decisionmaking process em-
ployed by the directors, including the information on which the directors 
based their decision; and (b) a judicial examination of the reasonableness of 
the directors’ action in light of the circumstances then existing.”195  Directors 
are responsible for the burden of persuasion – namely, demonstrating that 
they were “adequately informed and acted reasonably.”196  The burden can be 
met with a showing that the decision was made in “good faith” after a “rea-
sonable investigation.”197  A board will then be required to show that the im-
position of the nomination restriction was reasonable in relation to the pur-
pose for which it was enacted.198  Nonetheless, “courts will not substitute 
their business judgment for that of the directors, but will determine if the 
directors’ decision was, on balance, within a range of reasonableness.”199 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Although the court was deprived of an opportunity to decide the validity 
of Epiq’s Notification Bylaw, the unresolved issue provides an opportunity to 
fill a hole in corporate law that will inevitably be of importance in an emerg-
ing era of shareholder activism.  A framework to determine the validity of 
 
 192. The proportional and neutral test appears to be a simplified construction of 
that rule since directors need only show the restriction is somehow in the best inter-
ests of the corporation. 
 193. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 660 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
 194. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 
1994). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). 
 198. “If a defensive measure is to come within the ambit of the business judgment 
rule, it must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed.”  Id. 
 199. Paramount Commc’ns, 637 A.2d at 45. 
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and extent to which shareholders’ right to nominate can be restricted has re-
mained largely non-existent to this point.  It appears that a large reason for 
that absence is due to a lack of consensus as to where the right to nominate 
originates.  Rather than continuing in uncertainty, courts should recognize 
that the right to nominate is an inherent right of share ownership.  That right 
should be limited only when doing so promotes a legitimate corporate pur-
pose.  Fundamental rights have always been afforded a stricter standard of 
scrutiny when a restriction placed on them is challenged by those subject to 
the restriction.  Corporate rights need not be viewed any differently.  Share-
holder challenges to nomination restrictions enacted by a board alone should 
be reviewed under a conditional business judgment rule.  As shareholder ac-
tivism increases and boards of directors seek to mitigate the rising risk of 
dysfunction caused by attempts to influence the company,200 it is essential 









 200. Atkins, Grossman & Welch, supra note 111. 
 201. Versus Russell 3000 is a stock market index, which acts as a point of refer-
ence for gauging how the overall market is performing. Russell US Indexes, FTSE 
RUSSELL, http://www.ftse.com/products/indices/russell-us (last visited Feb. 3, 2018). 
 
Table I:  Total Shareholder Returns 
 
Year 1 Year 3 Year 5 Year 10 
Versus Russell 3000201 
 
Epiq Systems (9.79%) 6.71% 3.55% 1.87% 
Russell 3000 2.57% 16.00% 14.11% 7.57% 
Outperformance /  
Underperformance 
12.36% 9.29% 9.29% 5.7% 
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APPENDIX A  
 Amended and Restated Bylaws of Epiq Systems, Inc. art. II, § 2.3 
(c) The shareholder’s notice required pursuant to Section 2.3(b) (the 
“Shareholder’s Notice”) shall, in the event it includes a nomination of per-
sons for election to the Board of Directors, set forth the following infor-
mation: 
(i) the name, address and contact information of the shareholder 
who owns 5% of the Corporation’s outstanding common stock and 
has held such shares for at least twenty-four months and who in-
tends to make the nomination of persons for election to the Board 
of Directors (the “Nominating Shareholder”) and any Shareholder 
Associated Person (such Shareholder Associated Person(s) and the 
shareholder who intends to make the nomination, the ‘‘Nominating 
Persons”); 
(ii) in addition, the Nominating Persons shall provide the following 
information: 
(A) the class and number of shares of stock of the Corporation 
which are owned and held by the Nominating Shareholder; 
(B) a detailed listing of all acquisitions or dispositions of stock 
of the Corporation by the Nominating Shareholder (including 
the number of shares acquired or disposed of in such transac-
tion) during the twenty-four months preceding the date of the 
Shareholder’s Notice; 
(C) the class and number of shares of stock of the Corporation 
which are directly or indirectly held of record or beneficially 
owned (as such term is defined in 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3 
(“Ru1e 13d-3”» by each of the Nominating Persons, the date 
such shares were acquired and the investment intent of such 
acquisition; 
(D) with respect to the Corporation’s securities, a detailed de-
scription of any Derivative Positions directly or indirectly held 
or beneficially held by each Nominating Person and the date 
on which such Derivative Positions were acquired; 
(E) whether and the extent to which a Hedging Transaction has 
been entered into by or on behalf of each Nominating Person 
and a detailed description of such Hedging Transaction, in-
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cluding the date on which any such Hedging Transactions was 
entered into or materially modified; 
(F) detailed disclosures (including date, substantive description 
of all matters discussed and participants) with respect to each 
direct or indirect (through any agent, representative or other 
person) communication, arrangement or agreement, in each 
case, whether written or oral (any such communication, ar-
rangement or agreement, a “13d Communication”) during the 
twelve months preceding the date of the Shareholder’s Notice, 
between any Nominating Persons or any Proposed Nominees 
(as defined below), on the one hand, and any person or entity 
that was at the time of such 13d Communication, or has since 
become, required to file pursuant to 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l of 
the Exchange Act, on the other hand, in respect of their inter-
ests in the Corporation and, in the case of any written 13d 
Communication, copies thereof; 
(G) detailed disclosures about any person who contacted or 
was contacted by the Nominating Persons regarding the Pro-
posed Nominees during the twelve months prior to the date of 
the Shareholder’s Notice, including in such disclosure the 
name and address of the contacted or contacting person and the 
date of contact; 
(H) information detailing the investment intent or objective of 
each of the Nominating Persons, including in each case infor-
mation verifying the date on which such investment intent was 
formed or changed; 
(I) a representation that the Nominating Person or Nominating 
Persons are entitled to vote in the election of directors at the 
meeting and intends to appear in person or by proxy at the 
meeting to nominate the Proposed Nominees; 
(J) a representation as to whether any Nominating Persons will 
solicit, directly or indirectly, a proxy from the holders of a suf-
ficient number of the Corporation’s outstanding shares re-
quired in order to elect each Proposed Nominee or otherwise to 
solicit proxies from shareholders in support of the nomination 
(such representation, a “Nomination Solicitation Statement”); 
and 
(K) any other information required to be included in a proxy 
statement or other filings required to be made in connection 
with the solicitation of proxies or consents for a contested elec-
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tion of directors (even if an election contest or proxy solicita-
tion is not involved) pursuant to Section 14 of the Exchange 
Act, and the rules, regulations and schedules promulgated 
thereunder; 
(iii) in addition, the Nominating Persons shall provide the follow-
ing in respect of the person or persons to be nominated for election 
to the Board of Directors by the Nominating Persons (the “Pro-
posed Nominees”): 
(A) the name, address and contact information of the Proposed 
Nominees; 
(B) a statement of the Proposed Nominee’s qualifications; 
(C) a description of any and all historical, current or planned 
compensatory, payment or other financial agreement, ar-
rangement or understanding (oral or written) between the Pro-
posed Nominees, on the one hand, and any other person or en-
tity (including the Nominating Persons) other than the Corpo-
ration, on the other hand, in each case in connection with can-
didacy or service as a director of the Corporation; 
(D) the class and number of shares of stock of the Corporation 
which are directly or indirectly held of record or beneficially 
owned (as such term is defined in Rule 13d-3) by each of the 
Proposed Nominees, the date such shares were acquired and 
the investment intent of such acquisition; 
(E) with respect to the Corporation’s securities, a detailed de-
scription of any Derivative Positions directly or indirectly held 
or beneficially held by each Proposed Nominee and the date on 
which such Derivative Positions were acquired; 
(F) whether and the extent to which a Hedging Transaction has 
been entered into by or on behalf of each Proposed Nominee 
and a detailed description of such Hedging Transaction, in-
cluding the date on which any such Hedging Transaction was 
entered into or materially modified; 
(G) the written consent signed by each Proposed Nominee evi-
dencing a willingness to serve as a director if elected; 
(H) a commitment by each Proposed Nominee to meet person-
ally with the Corporation’s nominating and corporate govern-
ance committee; 
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(I) the completed and executed Nominee Representation and 
Agreement described in Section 2.3(j) of this Article II; and 
(J) any other information required to be included in a proxy 
statement or other filings required to be made in connection 
with the solicitation of proxies or consents for a contested elec-
tion of directors (even if an election contest or proxy solicita-
tion is not involved) pursuant to Section 14 of the Exchange 
Act, and the rules, regulations and schedules promulgated 
thereunder. 
APPENDIX B  
Director Appointment Agreement § 2(c) 
At any time after the 2015 Annual Meeting, Villere may terminate the 
Standstill Period upon ten (10) days’ written notice to the other parties to this 
Agreement and, following receipt of such notice, the Board may accept the 
resignation of the Villere Designee from the Board; provided, however, if the 
Villere Designee (or an alternate candidate designated by Villere and ap-
proved by the Board pursuant to Section 1(i)(B)) has been included on the 
Company’s slate of directors for an upcoming Annual Meeting, then the 
Standstill Period shall not be terminable until the day following such Annual 
Meeting.202 
 
 202. See Petition, supra note 5, at 18. 
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